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In this paper we try to explain and to predict the endogenous cartelization of markets with public
projects.
We consider large market games in which the agents decompose into ﬁnitely many disjoint
groups, each of which holds a corner of the market (glove markets with public projects). In glove
games or markets, groups of agents of the same type have corners of diﬀerent commodities. This
very simple but basic situation represents a signiﬁcant example in which the structure of the market
seems to oﬀer a strong incentive leading to the organization in cartels or syndicates (we assume that
contracts generating cartels can be legally enforced). Agents join forces in subcoalitions (cartels or
syndicates): they act intermediately as representative players of a short side market. The result
of bargaining is then implemented to the long side market.
A general equilibrium approach in exchange economies with public projects is not able to
predict, even in this simple situation, the formation of cartels. Speciﬁcally, results from bargaining
via cartels cannot be seen as consistent with the traditional solution concepts. This is the case
of the Foley core or of the core notions assuming a contribution measure. In the short side
market, cartels may accept distribution of proﬁts under core allocations much more favorable
with respect to results obtained without cartelization. Using suitable equivalences between core
notions with a given contribution measure and linear cost-share equilibria (see for example [7]), we
conjecture a similar result in the case of non-cooperative behavior, that is results emerging from
the cooperation within cartels diﬀer from what emerges if agents show price and cost-share taking
behavior. We expect a similar behavior for other game theoretical notions like the Shapley value
(see the discussion presented in [19]).
Consequently, we look at diﬀerent solution concepts that are capable to assign proﬁts towards
the long side of the markets, suggesting its endogenous cartelization. We introduce von Neumann-
Morgenstern solution concepts, suitably deﬁned in connection to public goods provision, exhibiting
a markedly diﬀerent behavior. We ﬁnd as necessary the assumption that stability is deﬁned with
respect to blocking procedures in which coalitions do not necessarily pay for the whole realization
of the project, but only for a fraction of it and that costs are distributed uniformly in each corner
of the market. Under this assumption, we obtain large games solutions by embedding procedures
in ﬁnite games (compare [16]).
In the second part of the paper, we go further in the investigation of vN-M stable sets in
exchange economies with public goods and a large number of traders of the same type: we shall
deﬁne stable sets following the ”sophisticated” approach suggested by Harsanyi proving that a
σ-sophisticated stable set corresponds to the solution in the associated payoﬀ space (see [15], [17]).
We assume throughout the paper that private decisions of economic agents are inﬂuenced by
non-market variables that we call public environments or public projects: examples include the
public goods provision (transport, health, education, international public goods like the global
climate), the regulation of private economic activities (regulation of quality standard, safety of
labor conditions, trade institutions), social rules (laws, property rights) among the others. They
are common to all the agents and aﬀect individual budget sets and private objectives.
It is worth noticing that in the investigated model, the concept of public project or environment
has to be considered as a very broad notion, allowing many diﬀerent problems to be treated within
one common setting. Technical diﬃculties deriving from a little structure imposed on the set
of public projects represent a minor cost given the level of generality of our framework. Hence,
building on the model originally proposed in Mas-Colell ([18]), we allow the public project to range
over an abstract set, a priori with no special structure, each project being characterized by a cost
in terms of private goods. Diﬀerently by the case of Samuelsonian public goods, represented by
classical Euclidean structures, the great generality of the adopted model does not impose any kind
of homogeneity assumption on the personal perceptions that agents may have of the same public
good. Moreover, it better describes public decision problems in which a choice must be given
among a few projects and permits the discussion of non convexity in public sector decisions. For
the interpretation of the Mas-Colell approach to public goods economies we refer to [6], [7], [8],
[11], [13], [14], for the extension of the Mas-Colell model to allow multiple private goods to [6], [5],
1[12], [2].
The ﬁrst part of the paper focuses on interactions among agents of the same type. In par-
ticular, the model aims to recognize and to anticipate the endogenous formation of cartels from
the predicting power of game theoretical cooperative solution concepts. The seminal paper [15]
discusses this problem in the case of large pure exchange economies in connection with the von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. He argues that the coalitions predicted by this solution con-
cept do indeed reﬂect cooperation within cartels. He does not explicitly construct vNM-stable
sets. Recently [20], [21] classify all vNM-stable sets in the non-atomic context investigating fur-
ther versions of cartelization of markets. In particular, [20] allows for the actual construction of
vNM-stable sets showing that agents on the short side of the market beneﬁt according to their
initial holdings. The theoretical basis developed in this paper are the premise in order to follow
the analogous construction in the case of public goods. For conditions ensuring the stability of
core allocations in non-atomic glove market games we shall refer to [9].
2 The Economic Model
We consider an economy EC in which:
• the space of agents is represented by a probability space (I,Σ,µ), where I = [0,1] is the set
of agents, Σ is the set of all measurable subsets of I and µ is a nonatomic measure;
• the private commodity space is represented by positive cone of I Rm, denoted by I Rm
+;
• an abstract set Y without any mathematical structure represents the set of public projects.
The cost of any public project in terms of private goods is expressed by means of a vector-
valued function c : Y → I Rm
+, called cost function.
• the weight that a coalition has in the realization of any public project is described by a con-
tribution measure, that is a probability measure b σ : Σ → [0,1] which is absolutely continuous
with respect to µ1.
We assume there are only ﬁnitely many types n of agents on the market, which means that we
refer to the decomposition I =
n [
i=1















in the same set Ii share the same initial endowment and the same preference. In particular, we
assume, that, for any i = 1,...,n and for any t ∈ Ii:
(1) consumer t has an initial endowment ωt > 0 and the total initial endowment ω =
R
I ωtdµ ￿
c(y)2, ∀y ∈ Y, to ensure that each private commodity is present on the market regardless to
the cost of the realized project.
(2) the preference of consumer t is represented by a function ut : I Rm
+ × Y → I R+. We say that,
ut is strictly monotone, continuous and quasi concave if, for any public project y ∈ Y, the
restriction ut(·,y) is strictly monotone, continuous and quasi concave.
(3) the contribution measure is uniform on agents of the same type, in the sense that, for any
coalition b S it results:




µ(b S ∩ Ii)
µ(Ii)
1We mean that b σ (I) = 1 and for any coalition E ∈ Σ such that µ(E) = 0 it results b σ (E) = 0.
2We follow the standard notation according to which for two vectors x ≡ (x1,...xm) and z ≡ (z1,...zm) of I Rm
+
x ￿ z means that xi > zi, for each i = 1,...m.
2A feasible allocation for the economy EC is a couple (f,y) where f : I → I Rm
+ is a µ-integrable
function and y ∈ Y, such that
Z
I




A feasible allocation (f,y) is called symmetric if it assigns identical bundles to agents of the same
type, that is f(t) = xi for any i = 1,...,n and for any t ∈ Ii.
Now we can consider a ﬁnite economy E which has the same data of EC, but consists of n agents.
For this economy a contribution measure is an additive function σ deﬁned on the set of all the
agents N = {1,2,...,n} such that σ(∅) = 0 and σ (N) = 1. Obviously, we have that







, for all E ∈ Σ (1)
is a contribution measure for EC;




b σ(Ii), for all S ⊆ N (2)
is a contribution measure for E.
An assignment (x1,...,xn,y) ∈ I Rm
+ × Y is a feasible allocation in E if
n X
i=1




Observe that an allocation (x1,...,xn,y) in E can be interpreted as a symmetric allocation
(f,y) in EC, where f is the function deﬁned as f(t) = xi, if t ∈ Ii. Reciprocally, an allocation (f,y)












for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (3)
are disjoint, that is each commodity is initially owned by only one type of trader.
We assume the existence of a distinguished project, denoted by 0, such that c(0) = 0. It is to be
interpreted as the ”status quo”, i.e., as the situation from which a change is being contemplated.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A feasible allocation (f,y) (or (x1,...,xn,y) ) is a individually rational allocation
if ut(f(t),y) ≥ ut(ω(t),0) for almost all t ∈ I (or ui(xi,y) ≥ ui(ωi,0) for all i = 1,...,n).
Deﬁnition 2.2 Given two allocations (f,y) and (g,z), a coalition b S with nonnull measure and a
contribution measure b σ, we say that (f,y) b σ-dominates (g,z) on b S if
Z
b S




ut(f(t),y) > ut(g(t),z) for almost all t ∈ b S.
We say that (f,y) b σ-dominates (g,z), if there exists a coalition b S with nonnull measure such that
(f,y) b σ-dominates (g,z) on b S.
3Analogously in the ﬁnite economy E, if σ is a contribution measure, we say that the allocation
(x1,...,xn,y) σ-dominates (g1,...,gn,z) on a nonempty coalition S if
X
i∈S




ui(xi,y) > ui(gi,z) for all i ∈ S.
We say that (x1,...,xn,y) σ-dominates (g,z) if there exists a nonempty coalition S such that
(x1,...,xn,y) σ-dominates (g1,...,gn,z) on S.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Given a contribution measure b σ, a solution of EC is a set A of individually rational
allocations such that:
- A is internally consistent, that is no two elements of A b σ-dominate each other,
- A is extradominative, that is each individually rational allocation not in A is b σ-dominated by
some element of A.
Analogously we can deﬁne a solution for the ﬁnite economy E.
A permutation in EC is a one-to-one µ-measure preserving function π from I to I, measurable
in both directions, such that for all t ∈ I, πt and t belong to Ii for the same i.
A set A of allocations is symmetric if for each permutation π and each (f,y) ∈ A, the allocation
(πf,y), deﬁned as (πf)(t) = f(πt), is also in A.
Deﬁnition 2.4 A symmetric solution of EC is a solution that is a symmetric set.
Recalling that a feasible allocation (f,y) of EC is said to be symmetric if f(t) = xi for almost all
t ∈ Ii and for all i = 1,...,n, we can prove that
Lemma 2.5 Let (f,y) and (g,z) be symmetric allocations in EC with f(t) = xi and g(t) = gi for
almost all t ∈ Ii. If (f,y) b σ-dominates (g,z) in EC, then (x1,...,xn,y) σ-dominates (g1,...,gn,z)
in E.
proof: Since (f,y) b σ-dominates (g,z), there exists a coalition b S with µ(b S) > 0, such that
Z
b S




ut(f(t),y) > ut(g(t),z) for almost all t ∈ b S.
Let S =
n
i | b S ∩ Ii 6= ∅
o
, then S is not empty and ui(xi,y) > ui(gi,z) for all i ∈ S. Moreover,








xiµ(b S ∩ Ii) + σ({i})























ωiµ(b S ∩ Ii)
so, for any k = 1,...,m
X
i∈S















i µ(b S ∩ Ii).
4If k / ∈ ∪i∈SMi, then
P
i∈S ωk






























i∈S xi + σ(S)c(y) ≤
P
i∈S ωi, and (x1,...,xn,y) σ-dominates (g1,...,gn,z) in E. 2
Lemma 2.6 Let (f,y) be an i.r. allocation such that the set
Si =
￿







has nonnull measure. Then there exists ηi ≤ ξi such that the set
Ui = {t ∈ Ii | ui(f(t),y) < ui(ηi,y) }
has nonnull measure and ui(ηi,y) > ui(ω(t),0) on a subset of Ii having nonnull measure.
proof: Since (f,y) is an individually rational feasible allocation we have
Z
I




ut(f(t),y) ≥ ut(ω(t),0) for almost all t ∈ I.
Let us consider the set
Vi = {t ∈ Ii | ui(f(t),y) < ui(ξi,y) }.
If µ(Vi) = 0, then ui(f(t),y) ≥ ui(ξi,y) for almost all t ∈ Ii. The set
C =
￿
l ∈ I Rm
+ | ui(l,y) ≥ ui(ξi,y) with l 6= ξi
￿


















fdµ + ξiµ(Ii \ Si)
then







Si fdµ = ξi ∈ C, hence a contradiction. Then µ(Vi) > 0.
If ξi = 0 then f(t) = 0 almost everywhere on Ii and µ(Si) = 0, so ξi ≥ 0 and for almost a
component k it results ξk
i > 0. Since utility functions are continuous, we can ﬁnd ε > 0 such that
if ηi = ξi − εek, then the set
Ui = {t ∈ Ii | ui(f(t),y) < ui(ηi,y) }
has nonnull measure and ui(ηi,y) > ui(f(t),y) ≥ ui(ω(t),0) for all t ∈ Ui.
2
Lemma 2.7 Let (f,y) be an allocation in EC, let S ⊂ I and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then there exists Sα ⊂ S
such that







5proof: The proof follows from the Lyapunov convexity theorem. 2
Theorem 2.8 Let B be a solution of the economy E. If A denotes the set of symmetric allocations
of the economy EC associated to B, then A is a symmetric solution of EC.
proof: The set A is symmetric by construction, in light of lemma (2.5), is internally consistent
and its elements are obviously individually rational. We have to prove the extradominance.
Let (f,y) be an individually rational allocation not in A.
If (f,y) is symmetric, then f(t) = xi for almost all t ∈ Ii for all i = 1,...,n. Clearly, the
allocation (x1,...,xn,y) is not in B, and so there exists an allocation (g1,...,gn,z) ∈ B and a not
empty coalition S such that
X
i∈S




ui(gi,z) > ui(xi,y) ∀i ∈ S.
Let b S = ∪i∈SIi and g(t) = gi if t ∈ Ii, then (g,z) ∈ A and b σ-dominates (f,y) since, dividing by n
the previous inequalities, we obtain
Z
b S




ut(g(t),z) > ut(f(t),y) for almost all t ∈ b S.
If (f,y) is not symmetric, then for all i ∈ S = {j ∈ {1,...,n} | µ(Sj) > 0 }, the set
Si =
￿







has nonnull measure, and so from lemma (2.6) there exists ηi ≤ ξi such that the set
Ui = {t ∈ Ii | ui(f(t),y) < ui(ηi,y) }
has nonnull measure and ui(ηi,y) ≥ ui(ω(t),0) on Ui.
Let δ =
P
i∈S ξi −ηi ≥ 0, and consider the allocation (η1,...,ηn,y) with ηi = ξi + 1
n−|S|δ if i / ∈ S,


































Let be Ui =
￿
Ui if i ∈ S
Ii if i / ∈ S , α = min1≤i≤nµ(Ui) and Vi ⊆ Ui with µ(Vi) = α.
If (η1,...,ηn,y) ∈ B, then the allocation (g,y) with g(t) = gi if t ∈ Ii belongs to A and, from













it follows that (g,z) b σ-dominates (f,y) on the coalition ∪n
i=1Vi.
If (η1,...,ηn,y) / ∈ B, then, being B a solution, there exists an allocation (h1,...,hn,z) in B
and a not empty coalition H, such that,
X
i∈H




6ui(hi,z) > ui(ηi,y) for any i ∈ H.
Then the allocation (h,z) with h(t) = hi if t ∈ Ii belongs to A and b σ-dominates (f,y) on the
coalition b H = ∪i∈HIi since b σ( b H) = σ(H).
In any case the property of extradominance is proved and A is a solution. 2
To prove the converse of theorem (2.8) we need the following lemma which does not make use of
assumption (3).
Lemma 2.9 Let A a symmetric solution of the economy EC. Then every allocation (f,y) in A is
symmetric.
proof: Suppose (f,y) ∈ A is not symmetric, then there is some i0 such that the set
(







is nonnull. Using lemma (2.6) for this i0, we get ηi0 ≤ εi0 such that the set
b Si0 = {t ∈ Ii0 | ut(f(t),y) < ut(ηi0,y)}
has a nonnull measure and ut(ηi0,y) ≥ ut(ωi0,0) for almost all t ∈ Si0.
Let us deﬁne δ = εi0 − ηi0 ≥ 0, α




n−1 ∀t ∈ Ii with i 6= i0
ηi0 ∀t ∈ Ii0
.
Using lemma (2.7), for all i 6= i0 we ﬁnd a set b Si ⊂ Ii such that µ(b Si) = αµ(Ii) and
R
b Si gdµ =
α
R
Ii gdµ. Then the allocation (g,y) b σ-dominates (f,y) on the coalition S = ∪n
i=1b Si. In fact,


































ωdµ − b c(y) ≤
Z
∪b Si
ωdµ − b σ(S)b c(y)
Hence (g,y) is not a member of A, and there exists some (h,z) ∈ A which b σ-dominates (g,y) on a
nonnull coalition U. Without loss of generality (we may choose U so that µ(U) arbitrarily small),
we assume that
µ(U ∩ Ii0) ≤ µ(b Si0)
If µ(U ∩ Ii0) = 0, then (h,z) b σ-dominates (f,y) via U. If µ(U ∩ Ii0) > 0, let Vi0 ⊂ b Si0 such that
µ(U ∩ Ii0) = µ(Vi0), and deﬁne π to be a permutation interchanging Vi0 with U ∩ Ii0, and being
otherwise the identity. Then π(f,y) = (πf,y) is also in A, since A is symmetric, and obviously
(h,z) b σ-dominates π(f,y) via U. In any case we get domination between two members of A, hence
a contradiction since A is internally consistent. 2
Theorem 2.10 Let A be a symmetric solution of EC. If B denotes the set of allocations of the
economy E associated to A, then A is a solution of E.
proof: The set B is well deﬁned by lemma (2.9). Its internal consistency and extradominance
follow easily from the same properties of A. 2
7Remark 2.11 We can give the stability deﬁnitions above using the classical concept of dominance
without involving contribution measure, that is an allocation (f,y) dominates (g,z) if there exists
a nonnull coalition S such that
Z
S




ut(f(t),y) > ut(g(t),z) for almost all t ∈ S.
results hold also for this case.
We just point out that σ-stability and stability without contribution measure are independent
concepts. Indeed it is easy to show that
if the set A is σ-internally stable, then A is also internally stable;
if the set A is externally stable, then A is also σ-externally stable.
Our interest in σ-stability is motivated by the fact that the σ-dominance concept ensures core
equivalence results which do not hold using the classical concept of dominance.
The next results refer to a contribution measure σ which is not necessarily uniform on agents
of the same type.
Proposition 2.12 Let σ be a contribution measure and Aσ a stable set with respect to σ. Then
the allocations contained in Aσ are Pareto optimal.
proof: Assume that the allocation (f,y) ∈ Aσ is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists a feasible
allocation (g,z) such that ut(g(t),z) > ut(f(t),y) for almost all t ∈ I. If (g,z) ∈ Aσ, then we
contradict the internal σ-stability of Aσ, then (g,z) / ∈ Aσ. If (g,z) is individually rational, then
we can ﬁnd an allocation (h,s) ∈ Aσ which σ-dominates (g,z) and so also (f,y), a contradiction.
Hence (g,z) is not individually rational, that is there exists a coalition S with nonnull measure
such that ut(ω(t),0) > ut(g(t),z) > ut(f(t),y) for almost all t ∈ S, a contradiction that completes
the proof. 2
Proposition 2.13 Let σ be a contribution measure and Aσ a stable set with respect to σ. Then
the σ-core is contained in Aσ.
proof: Let (f,y) be an allocationcontained inthe σ-core. If (f,y) is not individuallyrational, then
we can ﬁnd a coalitionS with nonnull measure such that ut(ω(t),0) > ut(f(t),y) for almostall t ∈ S




S ωdµ. So (ω,0) σ-dominates (f,y) on S, a contradiction.
Then (f,y) is individually rational. If (f,y) / ∈ Aσ, we can ﬁnd an allocation (g,z) ∈ Aσ which
σ-dominates (f,y), a contradiction since (f,y) is in the σ-core. Hence (f,y) ∈ Aσ. 2
Let us consider the economy EC and denote by P the set of all Pareto optimal allocations which
are symmetric and individually rational. If Aσ is a σ-solution (with σ not necessarily uniform on
agents), then in light of Lemma 1.9 and Proposition 2.12, Aσ ⊆ P. Let us assume that
(h1) the set Y of public projects is compact,
(h2) the σ-dominance is deﬁned with respect to those coalition S such that µ(S∩Ii) > 0 for every
i = 1,···,n.
Then our assumptions ensure that P is the unique solution with respect to σ.
We have to prove that P is internally and externally σ-stable.
Proposition 2.14 Under the assumption (h1), the set P is σ-internally stable.
8proof: If P is not σ-internally stable, then we can ﬁnd (f,y), (g,z) ∈ P and a coalition S with
µ(S ∩ Ii) > 0 for every i = 1,···,n, such that
ut(f(t),y) > ut(g(t),z) for almost all t ∈ S
Z
S




Being the allocations in P symmetric, it results f(t) ∼ fi and g(t) ∼ gi for almost all t ∈ Ii and for
every i = 1,···,n. So, being ui(fi,y) > ui(gi,z) for every i = 1,···,n, and since (f,y) is feasible
we obtain a contradiction since (g,z) is a Pareto optimal allocation. 2
Proposition 2.15 Under the assumption (h2), the set P is σ-externally stable.
proof: Let us consider an individually rational allocation (f,y) which is not in P. Then or
(1) (f,y) is symmetric but not Pareto optimal or
(2) (f,y) is a nonsymmetric Pareto optimal allocation.
In both cases we have to ﬁnd an allocation in P which σ-dominates (f,y).
If (1) holds, then, there exists an allocation (g,z) (that we can assume to be a Pareto optimal by
compactness of Y), such that
ut(g(t),z) > ut(f(t),y) for almost all t ∈ I
Z
I




So (g,z) is individually rational and if it is also symmetric, we can conclude that (g,z) ∈ P.
Otherwise, as in the case (2), (g,z) is a nonsymmetric Pareto optimal allocation. Consequently,
to complete the proof, we have to show the statement if the case (2) holds.
For every j = 1,···,n, let us deﬁne the set
Sj =
(







We claim that there exists at least one index j such that µ(Sj) > 0. If µ(Sj) = 0, then it results
ut(f(t),y) ≥ ut(e fj,y) for almost all t ∈ Ij. Then,
ut(f(t),y) = ut(e fj,y) for almost all t ∈ Ij, or
µ(Aj) > 0, with Aj =
n
t ∈ Ij : uj(f(t),y) > uj(e fj,y)
o
.
Let be Bj = Ij \Aj, and assume µ(Bj) = 0. Then uj(f(t),y) > uj(e fj,y) for almost all t ∈ Ij, and
so, by applying the Jensen’ s inequality, we obtain uj( 1
µ(Ij)
R
Ij fdµ,y) = uj(e fj,y) > uj(f(t),y) and
a contradiction. Then it results µ(Bj) > 0.















Then uj(A,y) > uj(e fj,y), uj(B,y) > uj(e fj,y) and αA + (1 − α)B = e fj. Since utility functions
are convex, we have uj(αA + (1 − α)B,y) > uj(e fj,y), a contradiction. Then µ(aj) = 0 and the
allocation (f,y) is symmetric, a contradiction. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume
9that µ(S1) > 0.
By continuity, it results
S1 = ∪n∈I N
￿
t ∈ S1 : u1(
n
n + 1
e f1,y) > u1(f(t),y)
￿
and, without loss of generality, we can assume that the set
P1 =
￿
t ∈ S1 : u1(
n0
n0 + 1
e f1,y) > u1(f(t),y)
￿
has nonnull measure.
For any j = 2,···,n let us consider the set
Pj =
n
t ∈ S1 : uj(e fj,y) ≥ uj(f(t),y)
o
.
If µ(Pj) = 0, then uj(f(t),y) > uj(e fj,y) for almost all t ∈ Ij and so uj(e fj,y) > uj(e fj,y), a
contradiction. Hence µ(Pj) > 0 for every j = 1,...,n.
Let us deﬁne ε < min
n
µ(Pj)
µ(Ij) : j = 1,···,m
o
, and consider
- the set Qj ⊂ Pj such that σ(Qj) = εσ(Pj) and µ(Qj) = εµ(Pj),






e f1 if t ∈ Q1




e f1 if t ∈ Qj and j 6= 1


































I hdµ+ c(y) ≤
R








εσ(Ij) = εσ(I) = ε





















hdµ + σ(Q)c(y) = ε
Z
I







By construction the allocation(h,y) is strictly preferred to (f,y) on Q, so if (h,y) is not individually
rational, then we have ut(ω(t),0) > ut(e fj,y) for almost all t ∈ Ij and j = 1,···,n, a contradiction.
Now let us consider the function e h deﬁned as e hj(t) = 1
µ(Ij)
R
Ij hdµ for all t ∈ Ij and j = 1,···,n.
By deﬁnition of h and choosing suitable e ε and aj, we can write e hj = e εe fj + (1 − e ε)aj, so that the
allocation (e h,y) is strictly preferred to (f,y) almost everywhere on Q. Moreover (e h,y) is obviously
feasible on Q, individually rational and symmetric; so if (e h,y) is also Pareto optimal the proof is
complete. If (e h,y) is not Pareto optimal, then the corresponding allocation in the ﬁnite economy E,
10(f h1,···, f hn,y) is not Pareto optimal, so there exists a Pareto optimal allocation (l1,···,lm,s) such
that
Pm
j=1 lj + c(s) ≤
Pm
j=1 ωj and uj(lj,s) > uj( e hj,y) for all j = 1,···,n. The corresponding
allocation (l,s) in the continuum economy EC is then symmetric, Pareto optimal and dominates
(h,y), a contradiction. 2
Using previous results we can conclude that
Proposition 2.16 Under assumptions (h1) and (h2) the set P is the unique σ-stable set.
3 σ-sophisticated stable sets in E
Let us denote by A the set of feasible allocations of the economy E and by V the set of feasible
payoﬀs that is
V = {u(x,y) = (u1(x1,y),...,un(xn,y)) | (x1,···,xn,y) ∈ A}.
Moreover for a set B ⊆ A, let
u(B) ≡ {u(x,y) | (x,y) = (x1,...,xn,y) ∈ B}.
Finally, for a coalitionS, (x1,···,xn,y) ∈ A and ξ ∈ V , we denote by (xS,y) and ξS the restrictions
of (x1,···,xn,y) and ξ on S, respectively.
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and the set of Sσ-feasible payoﬀs is given by
V (S) =
n






∈ A(S) such that ξi = ui(xi,y)
o
.
Proposition 3.1 Let CP denote the payoﬀ σ-core, that is the set of all payoﬀs in V that are
undominated. Then
CP = {u(x,y) | (x,y) = (x1,···,xn,y) ∈ σ-core}
proof: Assume by contradiction that there exists ξ ∈ CP and (x,y) = (x1,···,xn,y) ∈ A such





∈ A(S) such that
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ui(gi,z) > ui(xi,y) for all i ∈ S.
But then, (ui(gi,z))i∈S dominates ξ on S, contradicting ξ ∈ CP.
Conversely, let (x,y) = (x1,···,xn,y) belong to the σ-core and assume u(x,y) / ∈ CP. Then there









(x,y) on S, hence a contradiction. So the proposition is proved. 2
Since for every coalition S we have V (S) = u(A(S)), it seems plausible to expect that the
analogous of proposition 3.1 holds for σ-stable sets, namely, that is if HA is an allocation σ-stable
set then u(HA) is a payoﬀ σ-stable set and conversely if HP is a payoﬀ σ-stable set then u−1(HP)
is an allocation σ-stable set. However, as shown in [17] for the case of economies without public
projects and contribution measures, this result is not true. Because of such reasoning, in line with
[15], we suggest the following modiﬁcation of the notion of σ-stability.
11Deﬁnition 3.2 For ξ and η in V , we say that η indirectly σ-dominates ξ and write η ￿￿ ξ,





ξ0 = ξ, ξm = η and for j = 1,...,m and for all i ∈ Sj the following three conditions hold:








where ξj,Sj represents the restriction to coalition Sj of the feasible payoﬀ ξj.
A set of payoﬀs HP ⊆ V is a payoﬀ σ-sophisticated stable set if
ξ ∈ V \ HP ⇐⇒ there exists η ∈ HP such that η ￿￿ ξ.
Extending the deﬁnition to the allocations space, we have
Deﬁnition 3.3 For (x1,···,xn,y) and (g1,...,gn,z) in A, we say that (g1,...,gn,z) indirectly σ-





ν=1} such that (x0,y0) = (x,y), (xm,ym) = (g,z) and for
j = 1,...,m and for all i ∈ Sj the following three conditions hold:
(xj,Sj,yj) ∈ A(Sj), ui(x
j−1




i ,yj−1) < ui(xm
i ,ym), (5)
where (xj,Sj,y) represents the restriction to coalition Sj of the feasible allocation (xj,y).
A set of allocations HA ⊆ A is an allocation σ-sophisticated stable set if
(x1,···,xn,y) ∈ A \ HA ⇐⇒ there exists (g1,...,gn,z) ∈ HA s.t. (g,z) ￿￿ (x,y).
An important feature of the σ-sophisticated stable sets is that every element in such a set is
individually rational.
Proposition 3.4 Assume that the set of linear cost share equilibria is not empty. If (g1,...,gn,z)
belongs to the allocations σ-sophisticated stable set HA, then (g1,...,gn,z) is individually rational.
If ξ belongs to the payoﬀs σ-sophisticated stable set HP, then ξ is individually rational.
proof: Let (g,z) = (g1,...,gn,z) ∈ A be not individually rational, that is there exists k ∈ I such
that uk(gk,z) < uk(ωk,0). Since uk(·,0) is continuous and strictly monotone, and ωk 6= 0, there
exists hk < ωk such that
uk(gk,z) < uk(hk,0) < uk(ωk,0).
Moreover, being c(0) = 0, we have that the allocation (h,0) with hi = 0 if i 6= k σ-dominates
(g,z) on the coalition {k}. Let (x,y) = (x1,...,xn) be a linear cost share equilibrium, then (x,y)
is individually rational. If not, we can ﬁnd a k ∈ I such that, denoted with p(·) the price system
corresponding to (x,y), it results
p(0) · ωk = p(0) · ωk + p(0) · ϕ(k)c(0) > p(0) · ωk,
hence a contradiction.
So (h,0) is σ-dominated by (x,y) using the grand coalition.
So (x,y) ￿￿ (g,z). Since (x,y) in the σ-Aubin core, which is contained in the σ-core, external
stabilities implies (x,y) ∈ HA, so (g,z) / ∈ HA.
An analogous argument used in the utility space shows that if ξ ∈ V is not individually rational
then ξ / ∈ HP. 2
Lemma 3.5 Let η and ξ in V , and let η = u(x,y) be individually rational. If η ￿￿ ξ, then there
exists η = u(x,y) such that η ￿￿ ξ and ηi < ηi.





such that ξ0 = ξ, ξm = η and for j = 1,...,m and for all i ∈ Sj conditions (4) hold. Being ωi 6= 0,
ηi = ui(xi,y) ≥ ui(ωi,0) for all i and ui(·,y) continuous and strictly monotone, we can choose









satisﬁes conditions (4). So the lemma is
proved with η = u(αx,y). 2
Lemma 3.6 Let (g1,...,gn,z) and (x1,...,xn,y) in A, ξ = u(g,z) and assume that η = u(x,y)
is individually rational. Then, η ￿￿ ξ if and only if (x,y) ￿￿ (g,z).
proof: Assume that η ￿￿ ξ, by lemma 3.5 there exists η = u(x,y) such that η ￿￿ ξ and ηi < ξi.





that ξ0 = ξ, ξm = η and for j = 1,...,m and for all i ∈ Sj conditions (4) hold. So, for every









j=0 of allocations in A with (x0,y0) = (g,z),








conditions (5), thus (x,y) ￿￿ (g,z). Conversely, assume that (x,y) ￿￿ (g,z). Then there exists a




ν=1} such that (x0,y0) = (g,z),
(xm,ym) = (x,y) and for j = 1,...,m and for all i ∈ Sj conditions (5) hold. It is easy to check




ν=1} with ξj = u(xj,yj), we can conclude that η ￿￿ ξ.
2
Theorem 3.7 If HA is an allocation σ-sophisticated stable set then u(HA) is a payoﬀ σ-sophisticated
stable set and conversely, if HP is a payoﬀ σ- sophisticated stable set then u−1(HP) is an allocation
σ-sophisticated stable set.
proof: Let HA an allocation σ-sophisticated stable set, we need to prove that ξ ∈ V \u(HA) if and
only if there exists η in u(HA) such that η ￿￿ ξ. Let ξ ∈ V \ u(HA) and assume that ξ = u(x,y)
with (x,y) = (x1,...,xn,y) ∈ A. Then (x,y) / ∈ HA and, since HA is a σ-sophisticated stable set,
there exists (g,z) = (g1,...,gn,z) ∈ HA such that (g,z) ￿￿ (x,y). Then η = u(g,z) ∈ u(HA)
indirectly dominates ξ. Conversely assume by contradiction that there exists ξ and η in u(HA)
such that η ￿￿ ξ. Then there exists (x,y) = (x1,...,xn,y) and (g,z) = (g1,...,gn,z) in HA such
that ξ = u(x,y) and η = u(g,z). By lemma 3.6 and proposition 3.4, it follows that (g,z) ￿￿ (x,y)
which contradicts the internal stability of HA. An analogous argument proves the property in the
utility space. 2
4 σ-sophisticated stable sets in EC
It is the aim of this section to extend the previous results to the continuum economy EC. Recall
that, if we consider the associated economies EC and E, then conditions (1) and (2) deﬁne the
natural relation existing between the contribution measures b σ and σ.
Let us denote by AC the set of feasible allocations of the economy EC and by VC the set of
feasible payoﬀs that is
V = {ξ : I → I R+ | ξ(t) = ut(f(t),y)∀t ∈ I with (f,y) ∈ AC}.
Moreover for a set B ⊆ AC, let
u(B) ≡ {ξ : I → I R+ | ξ(t) = ut(f(t),y)∀t ∈ I with (f,y) ∈ B}.
Finally, for a coalition S, (f,y) ∈ AC and ξ ∈ VC, we denote by (fS,y) and ξS the restrictions of
(f,y) and ξ on S, respectively.
13For a coalition S, the set of Sσ-feasible allocations is given by
AC(S) =
￿
(f,y) with f intergable function and y ∈ Y |
Z
S






and the set of Sσ-feasible payoﬀs is given by
VC(S) = {ξ : S → I R+ | ∃(f,y) ∈ AC(S) such that ξ(t) = ut(f(t),y) ∀t ∈ S}.
Proposition 4.1 Let CP
C denote the payoﬀ σ-core, that is the set of all payoﬀs in VC that are
undominated. Then
CP
C = {ξ : I → I R+ | ξ(t) = ut(f(t),y) ∀t ∈ I and (f,y) ∈ σ-core}
proof: Assume by contradiction that there exists ξ ∈ CP
C and (f,y) ∈ AC such that ξ(t) =
ut(f(t),y) and (f,y) does not belong to the σ-core. Then there exist a coalition S with nonnull
measure, a µ-integrable function g : S → I Rm
+, and a public project z such that
Z
S




ut(g(t),z) > ut(f(t),y) for almost all t ∈ S.
But then, η(t) = ut(g(t),z) dominates ξ on S, contradicting ξ ∈ CP
C .
Conversely, let (f,y) belong to the σ-core and assume that the function ξ : I → I R+ deﬁned as
ξ(t) = ut(f(t),y) / ∈ CP
C . Then there exists η ∈ VC that dominates ξ, that is there exists a coalition
S with nonnull measure and (g,z) belonging to AC(S) such that η(t) = ut(g(t),z) > ut(f(t),y) for
almost all t ∈ S. Then (g,z) dominates (f,y) on S, hence a contradiction. So the proposition is
proved. 2
Since the analogous of proposition 4.1 does not hold for σ-stable sets, in line with Harsanyi
(1974), we suggest the following modiﬁcation of the notion of σ-stability.
Deﬁnition 4.2 For ξ and η in V , we say that η indirectly σ-dominates ξ and write η ￿￿ ξ, if there















i (t) < ξ
m
i (t). (6)
A set of payoﬀs HP ⊆ VC is a payoﬀ σ-sophisticated stable set if
ξ ∈ VC \ H
P ⇐⇒ there exists η ∈ H
P such that η ￿￿ ξ.
Lemma 4.3 i) Assume that u(f,y) indirectly b σ-dominates u(g,z) and consider the associated




and gi = 1
µ(Ii)
R
Ii gdµ. If in the economy E assumption (3) is satisﬁed, then (u1(x1,y),...,un(xn,y)) ￿￿
(u1(g1,z),...,un(gn,z)).
ii) Assume that, in the economy E, the payoﬀ (u1(x1,y),...,un(xn,y)) σ-dominates (u1(g1,y),...,un(gn,z)),
and consider the associated payoﬀs in EC, u(f,y) and u(g,z) with f(t) = xi and g(t) = gi
for all t ∈ Ii and i = 1,...,n. Then u(f,y) b σ-dominates u(g,z).












Ii fνd, for any ν = 0,...,m;
the coalition Sν = ∪{Ii∩Sν6=∅}Ii, for any ν = 1,...,m.
14In light of Liapunov arguments and previous results, we can immediately prove that, using the












the payoﬀ (u1(x1,y),...,un(xn,y)) indirectly σ-dominates (u1(g1,z),...,un(gn,z)).








the payoﬀ u(fν,yν) with fν(t) = xν
i, for any ν = 0,...,m and t ∈ Ii;
the coalition b Sν = ∪i∈SνIi, for any ν = 1,...,m.










, the payoﬀ u(f,y)
b σ-dominates u(g,z).
2
From the previous lemma, it follows that
Proposition 4.4 Assume (3). If HP









fdµ and u(f,y) ∈ HP
C
￿
is a payoﬀs σ- sophisticated stable set in E. Reciprocally, if HP is a payoﬀs σ-sophisticated stable




u(f,y) | f(t) = xi ∀t ∈ Ii and (u1(x1,y),...,un(xn,y)) ∈ HP￿
is a payoﬀs b σ- sophisticated stable set in E.
Extending the deﬁnition to the allocations space, we have
Deﬁnition 4.5 For (f,y) and (g,z) in AC, we say that (g,z) indirectly σ-dominates (f,y) and





ν=1} such that (f0,y0) = (f,y), (fm,ym) = (g,z) and for j =





A set of allocations HA ⊆ AC is an allocation σ-sophisticated stable set if
(g,z) ∈ AC \ HA ⇐⇒ there exists (g,z) ∈ HP such that (f,y) ￿￿ (g,z).
Lemma 4.6 i) Assume (f,y) indirectly b σ-dominates (g,z) and consider the associated alloca-
tions in E, (x1,...,xn,y) and (g1,...,gn,z) with xi = 1
µ(Ii)
R




in the economy E assumption (3) is satisﬁed, then (x1,...,xn,y) σ-dominates (g1,...,gn,z).
ii) Assume that, in the economy E, (x1,...,xn,y) σ-dominates (g1,...,gn,z), and consider the
associated allocations in EC, (f,y) and (g,z) with f(t) = xi and g(t) = gi for all t ∈ Ii. Then
(f,y) b σ-dominates (g,z).
proof:





ν=1} satisfying conditions (7), and deﬁne




Ii fνdµ, for any ν = 0,...,m;
the coalition Sν = ∪{Ii∩Sν6=∅}Ii, for any ν = 1,...,m.
In light of Liapunov arguments and previous results (as in the proof of lemma 2.5), we can im-










the allocation (x1,...,xn,z) indirectly σ-dominates (g1,...,gn,z).




ν=1} satisfying conditions (5), and deﬁne
the allocation (fν,yν) with fν(t) = xν
i, for any ν = 0,...,m;
the coalition b Sν = ∪i∈SνIi, for any ν = 1,...,m.











tion (f,y) b σ-dominates (g,z).
2
From the previous lemma, it follows that
Proposition 4.7 Assume (3). If HA
C is an allocations b σ-sophisticated stable set in EC, then the
corresponding set HA =
n
(x1,...,xn,y) | xi = 1
µ(Ii)
R
Ii fdµ and (f,y) ∈ HA
C
o
is an allocations σ-
sophisticated stable set in E. Reciprocally, if HA is an allocation σ-sophisticated stable set in E,




(f,y) | f(t) = xi ∀t ∈ Ii and (x1,...,y) ∈ HA￿
is an allocations b σ- sophisticated stable set in E.
Theorem 4.8 If HA
C is an allocations b σ-sophisticated stable set then u(HA
C ) is a payoﬀs b σ-sophisticated
stable set and conversely, if HP
C is a payoﬀ b σ- sophisticated stable set then u−1(HP
C ) is an alloca-
tions b σ-sophisticated stable set.
proof: The theorem follows from propositions 4.4 and 4.4. 2
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